Divergent competitiveness in the eurozone and the optimum currency area theory by João Rebelo Barbosa & Rui Henrique Alves
Divergent  Divergent  Divergent  Divergent  Divergent  Divergent  Divergent  Divergent 
Competitiveness  Competitiveness  Competitiveness  Competitiveness  Competitiveness  Competitiveness  Competitiveness  Competitiveness in the  in the  in the  in the  in the  in the  in the  in the 
Eurozone Eurozone Eurozone Eurozone Eurozone Eurozone Eurozone Eurozone and the  and the  and the  and the  and the  and the  and the  and the 
Optimum Currency Area  Optimum Currency Area  Optimum Currency Area  Optimum Currency Area  Optimum Currency Area  Optimum Currency Area  Optimum Currency Area  Optimum Currency Area 
FEP  WORKING  PAPERS FEP  WORKING  PAPERS FEP  WORKING  PAPERS FEP  WORKING  PAPERS FEP  WORKING  PAPERS FEP  WORKING  PAPERS FEP  WORKING  PAPERS FEP  WORKING  PAPERS
Research  Research  Research  Research 
Work Work Work Work in  in  in  in 
Progress Progress Progress Progress FEP  WORKING  PAPERS FEP  WORKING  PAPERS FEP  WORKING  PAPERS FEP  WORKING  PAPERS FEP  WORKING  PAPERS FEP  WORKING  PAPERS FEP  WORKING  PAPERS FEP  WORKING  PAPERS
n.  n.  n.  n. 436  436  436  436 Nov. 2011 Nov. 2011 Nov. 2011 Nov. 2011
Optimum Currency Area  Optimum Currency Area  Optimum Currency Area  Optimum Currency Area  Optimum Currency Area  Optimum Currency Area  Optimum Currency Area  Optimum Currency Area 
Theory Theory Theory Theory Theory Theory Theory Theory
João Rebelo Barbosa  João Rebelo Barbosa  João Rebelo Barbosa  João Rebelo Barbosa 1  1  1  1 
Rui Henrique  Rui Henrique  Rui Henrique  Rui Henrique Alves  Alves  Alves  Alves 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1  1  1  1 Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto
2  2  2  2 CEFUP CEFUP CEFUP CEFUP1 
 
 
DIVERGENT COMPETITIVENESS IN THE EUROZONE AND THE OPTIMUM 





Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto 
joaorebelobarbosa@gmail.com  
 
Rui Henrique Alves 
CEF.UP
‡ and NIFIP, Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto 
rhalves@fep.up.pt  
                                                       
* Corresponding author – contact: Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto, Rua Roberto Frias, 4200-464 
Porto, Portugal. 





As the euro is on its second decade, the European sovereign debt crisis and the ever more 
evident disparities in competitiveness among member states are prompting many to question 
whether monetary union is bringing more benefits than costs. The optimum currency area 
(OCA) theory provides a framework with several criteria for such analysis. Most literature 
focuses either or on OCA individual criteria or on an aggregate analysis of these criteria, 
using meta-properties.  
Differently, we start by a descriptive analysis of the first twelve euro countries under six 
criteria between 1999 and 2009. We detect signs of labour geographic mobility. However, 
nominal wages  growth largely outpaced productivity  growth in some periphery  countries, 
resulting in losses of competitiveness. Financial markets seem to be deeply integrated. Total 
intra-EMU  trade  increased,  though  core  countries  seem  to  have  benefited  more,  as  their 
relative competitiveness improved. We detect no increased homogeneity of exports structures 
of  EMU  countries.  Inflation  rates  alternated  between  periods  of  convergence  and  of 
divergence,  though  prices  levels  consistently  converged  between  EMU  countries.  Finally, 
budgetary indiscipline was frequent preventing several countries from having fiscal room to 
face asymmetrical shocks. 
We  conclude  by  estimating  the  impact  of  five  OCA  criteria  on  countries’  relative 
competitiveness, using real effective exchange rates as a proxy. Differences in the growth of 
unit labour costs, the dissimilarity of trade and the differences in output growth were found to 
be significant. With a higher confidence level, bilateral trade is significant and points towards 
the specialization paradigm. Thus, we identify some causes of the divergent competitiveness 
between some EMU countries that contributed to weaker economic growth in parts of the 
euro area. 
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In  1999,  eleven  European  countries  forsook  their  autonomous  monetary  policies  and 
currencies in favour of the euro. Since the 1990s, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
project has been analysed under the light of the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory. This 
framework has been used to assess if the benefits of a country belonging to the monetary 
union outweigh its costs (Mongelli, 2005). We revisit this issue more than ten years on as the 
euro area is going through its biggest test ever (OECD, 2010): an uneven recovery after the 
global economic crisis and a sovereign debt crisis that brought about unprecedented political 
tension (IMF, 2010).  
There has been much research on the EMU in the last decade and the OCA theory still guides 
many of the contributions on this field. Individual OCA properties (e.g. labour and capital 
markets  integration;  price  flexibility)  have  been  the  subject  of  attention  of  a  significant 
number  of  authors  (e.g.  Lopez  and  Papell,  2007;  Berger  and  Nitsch,  2008;  European 
Commission, 2008; Fratzscher and Stracca, 2009; Campolmi and Faia, 2011). Additionally, 
many have looked closely on meta-properties that aggregate several criteria, especially the 
synchronization of business cycles (Mongelli, 2005). There has been a special attention to 
evaluate whether this synchronization increased after the launch of the euro, i.e., if there has 
been an endogeneity of the OCA properties, as predicted by Frankel and Rose (1998). 
A different aspect is covered by other researchers who have studied the rising imbalances 
between  countries,  especially  in  their  current  accounts,  but  also  in  output  growth  and 
unemployment rates, with the core euro area performing much better than some periphery 
countries (OECD, 2010).  These imbalances eventually contributed to the current euro area 
sovereign debt crisis (Arghyrou and Chortareas, 2008; OECD, 2010; Zemanek et al. 2010). 
Our  approach  is  on  a  different  level.  At  a  first  moment,  using  macroeconomic  data,  we 
describe the economic performance and competitiveness of the first twelve countries to join 
the EMU, and then their evolution under individual OCA properties, between 1999 and 2009. 
Following  this,  we  assess  the  impact  of  some  of  these  properties  on  the  member  states’ 
relative  competitiveness.  For  this  purpose,  we  adapt  Bayoumi  and  Eichengreen’s  (1997) 
work,  using  OCA  criteria  to  explain  differences  in  the  variation  of  EMU  countries’ 
competitiveness, using real effective exchange rates as a proxy. 4 
 
The  present  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  In  Section  2,  we  briefly  review  the  relevant 
literature on the OCA theory. In Section 3, we take a brief overview over economic growth 
and competitiveness in the EMU in the period 1999-2009. In Section 4, we try to analyse the 
performance of the EMU in what concern several OCA properties. In Section 5, we proceed 
by estimating the impact of five OCA criteria on countries’ relative competitiveness. Finally, 
we  conclude,  by  summarizing  our  most  relevant  findings  as  well  as  their  limitations  and 
presenting some possible paths of future research. 
 
2. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON THE OCA THEORY 
Mundell (1961) introduced the  concept of OCA to refer to  a  geographic area that  would 
benefit  from  a  single  monetary  policy  under  a  common  currency  or  definitely  pegged 
exchange  rates.  This  was  an  answer  to  Friedman  (1953),  who  argued  that  only  flexible 
exchange rates allowed for corrective movements necessary to achieve external equilibrium.  
To define an OCA, Mundell (1961) considered the mobility of factors, especially labour, as 
the main criterion. Geographic mobility allowed for a compensation of shocks suffered in a 
part of the area, with workers moving from depressed regions to the others, thus eliminating 
the need for different monetary policies. Inter-industrial mobility should also be considered, 
since workers had to be able to take jobs in different industries (McKinnon, 1963; Kenen, 
1969).  Moreover,  financial  integration  would  also  help  mitigate  asymmetrical  shocks  by 
directing savings from surplus regions to affected ones (Ingram, 1962). 
Several factors were considered in the following years. McKinnon (1963) considered that the 
more a country is integrated in international trade, the more benefits it would enjoy from 
belonging to a currency area.  In this situation, depreciation would have a lesser effect in 
rebalancing a country’s external deficit.  Kenen (1969) argued that monetary unions would 
better suit countries with diversified economies, as demand or supply shocks that affected one 
sector could be more easily compensated by the others. Otherwise, Fleming (1971) considered 
that a monetary union required, above all, a similarity of inflation rates, to maintain balanced 
current-accounts in the different member states. Otherwise, differences of competitiveness 
would progressively arise, with countries with higher inflation running persistent deficits. 
Differently,  and  abandoning  macroeconomic  variables,  Mintz  (1970,  in  Tavlas,  1993) 
considered that political factors would be more decisive than economic ones in the feasibility 5 
 
of a currency area. Likewise, Haberler (1974: p. 394) doubted that a European single currency 
“would succeed without far-reaching political integration”.  
Since  the  late  1960s,  many  economists  criticized  the  single  criteria  approach  of  the  first 
decade  of  the  OCA  theory.  Some  criteria  were  difficult  to  measure  (Robson,  1998)  and 
interdependent (Ishiyama, 1975). This led to the situation that one could define very different 
regions  as  OCA  if  different  criteria  were  chosen  (Tavlas,  1994).  As  an  alternative,  some 
authors  proposed  that,  rather  than  focusing  in  one  or  another  criterion,  countries  should 
consider their own cost-benefit analysis (Fleming, 1971). 
Moreover, not only the single-criterion based approach but also some of the assumptions of 
the  OCA  theory  were  questioned  in  this  period.  It  was,  then,  assumed  that  the  long-run 
Phillips curve is negatively sloped, i.e., an expansionary monetary policy or exchange rate 
devaluation would lead to a decrease in unemployment. However, monetarists argued that 
workers reacted to higher inflation by demanding higher wage increases. This reduced the 
effectiveness  of  monetary  policy  to  change  employment  levels  (Tavlas,  1993).  Thus,  the 
argument “against currency unions was considerably weakened” (Matthes, 2009: p.115).  
Criticisms of the assumptions present in the OCA theory and the slowdown in the European 
monetary integration in the 1970s diminished the importance of the field of monetary unions, 
reducing the interest in its research until the end of the following decade. But this “intellectual 
purgatory” finished by the late 1980s as the project of a single European currency gained new 
impetus and previous contributions were reviewed (Dellas and Tavlas, 2009).  
The need to have similar inflation rates prior to joining a currency union was questioned. 
Some authors defended that, if one of the countries joining a currency union has a credible 
record  of  inflation  targeting  and  maintains  that  commitment  afterwards,  other  countries 
joining the union will end up with similar inflation rates, regardless their previous record 
(Giavazzi and Pagano, (1988) and Goodhart, 1989). This advantage was called reputational 
benefits (Tavlas, 1994). Notwithstanding, this optimistic perspective was challenged by some 
authors (Alberola and Tyrväinen, 1998; Alesina et al., 2002). The usefulness of autonomous 
exchange rates was put into doubt, since studies stressed that exchange rates adjustments 
happened with considerable lags from the underlying shocks (Tavlas, 1993). 
In the early 1990s, the criticism of the single-criterion based approach led many to adopt 
meta-properties, i.e., a joint analysis of how all OCA criteria affected the way countries in 6 
 
monetary  unions  reacted  to  shocks  (Mongelli,  2005).  There  were  several  possible  meta-
properties, namely: similarities of economic shocks and policy responses; synchronicity of 
business cycles; synchronicity of monetary transmission mechanisms (Matthes, 2009). Meta-
properties helped surpass the intrinsic contradictions of the  early  contributions (Mongelli, 
2005) and were also more easily measured than some individual criteria (Matthes, 2009).  
Nevertheless, their results could still be contradictory (Tavlas, 1994). 
In the 1990s, much attention was given to the the future European single currency (Tavlas, 
1994). Asymmetrical shocks in Europe were more evident than among US states (Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen, 1993a). However, there was evidence of smaller and more correlated shocks 
between  central  European  countries  (Bayoumi  and  Eichengreen,  1993b).  Bayoumi  and 
Eichengreen  (1997)  operationalized  the  OCA  theory,  creating  an  OCA  Index.  They 
concluded, again, that Germany, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands were the most suitable 
candidates to monetary unification. Also, the pairs of Portugal and Spain and of Italy and 
Greece would benefit from monetary integration with each other. 
This debate also led to the development of alternative approaches, especially the endogeneity 
paradigm of Frankel and Rose (1998). These authors argued that ex-ante criteria were not 
essential to the feasibility of an OCA, since most of them would evolve positively by effect of 
countries’ monetary integration. They tested their hypothesis, concluding that international 
trade promoted business cycles correlation (Frankel and Rose, 1998). Accordingly, countries 
that did not satisfy OCA criteria before joining a currency union might satisfy them later. 
During the first decade of the euro, much of the focus was on the meta-property of business 
cycles  synchronization,  though  a  consensus  has  not  been  found.  Whereas  some  authors 
concluded that evidence of endogeneity could be found (Duval et al. 2007; Silvestre and 
Mendonça,  2007;  Schiavo,  2008),  others  found  no  evidence  of  increased  synchronisation 
(European Commission, 2008a; Matthes, 2009; Willett at al., 2010; Weyerstrass et al., 2011).  
Despite  the  abundant  studies  using  meta-properties,  studies  on  individual  OCA  are  also 
numerous.  Considering  the  diversity  and  the  interest  of  most  of  these  studies  for  the 






Figure 1: Studies on OCA properties and the EMU 
Properties  Authors (year)  Main findings 
Labour mobility 
Issing (2000)  Labour markets were rigid in the run up to the EMU  
Alesina et al. (2010)  There was a tendency to create a two-tier labour market 
OECD (2007)  Geographic mobility was very low 
European 
Commission (2008a); 
Campolmi and Faia 
(2011) 





Rigidity contributed to the loss of competitiveness in the euro 
area periphery 
Hein and Truger 
(2005); Blanchard 
(2007) 





Commission (2008a)  Strong integration and an increase in intra-EMU FDI 
Fratzscher and Stracca 
(2009) 
Strong integration led to diminishing importance of domestic 
shocks but also to a sharing of national risks 
Danthine et al. (2001)  Convergence of interest rates on public debt (now  reduced) 




Commission (2008a)  Increase in intra-EMU trade 
Fontagné, et al. 
(2009) 
Intra-EMU trade brought about reduced price volatility and 
discrimination 
Berger and Nitsch 
(2008) 
Once we remove the historic tendency, there are no signs that 
monetary unification resulted in increased intra-EMU trade 
Kappler (2011) 
The positive relation between trade and business cycle 





Mongelli (2008)  Dispersion of inflation rates in the EMU fell to historic levels 
Lopez and Papell 
(2007); Zhou et al. 
(2008) 
Convergence of inflation rates began before monetary unification, 
casting doubts on the role of the single currency in the process 
Chen and Mahajan 
(2010) 
There are more signs of PPP between currency blocks than inside 
them 
Fiscal integration 
OECD (2000)  Fiscal discipline diminished after the launch of the EMU  




3. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND COMPETITIVENESS IN THE EMU 
The first step on our assessment is a descriptive comparison of economic performance in the 
twelve countries. For this purpose, we take a look at GDP growth (Kappler, 2011). As a 
simple measure of dispersion in this variable, as in following ones, we will use the standard 
deviation. In Figure 2 we present each country’s annual GDP growth rate. 
Figure 2: GDP growth rate in EMU countries (%) (1999-2009) 
Country / Year  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Austria  3.3  3.7  0.5  1.6  0.8  2.5  2.5  3.6  3.7  2.2  -3.9 
Belgium  3.5  3.7  0.8  1.4  0.8  3.2  1.7  2.7  2.9  1.0  -2.8 
Finland  3.9  5.3  2.3  1.8  2.0  4.1  2.9  4.4  5.3  0.9  -8.2 
France  3.3  3.9  1.9  1.0  1.1  2.5  1.9  2.2  2.4  0.2  -2.6 
Germany  2.0  3.2  1.2  0.0  -0.2  1.2  0.8  3.4  2.7  1.0  -4.7 
Greece  3.4  4.5  4.2  3.4  5.9  4.4  2.3  4.5  4.3  1.3  -2.3 
Ireland  10.9  9.7  5.7  6.5  4.4  4.6  6.0  5.3  5.6  -3.5  -7.6 
Italy  1.5  3.7  1.8  0.5  0.0  1.5  0.7  2.0  1.5  -1.3  -5.0 
Luxembourg  8.4  8.4  2.5  4.1  1.5  4.4  5.4  5.0  6.6  1.4  -3.7 
Netherlands  4.7  3.9  1.9  0.1  0.3  2.2  2.0  3.4  3.9  1.9  -3.9 
Portugal  4.1  3.9  2.0  0.7  -0.9  1.6  0.8  1.4  2.4  0.0  -2.5 
Spain  4.7  5.0  3.6  2.7  3.1  3.3  3.6  4.0  3.6  0.9  -3.7 
Standard 
Deviation 
2.535  1.954  1.42  1.831  1.915  1.169  1.641  1.175  1.438  1.492  1.829 
Source: Eurostat 
 
We conclude that, despite some volatility, there has been a tendency for a reduction in the 
dispersion of GDP growth rates. Nevertheless, in the last two years, there was an increase in 
the dispersion, probably as a result of the global economic crisis (IMF, 2011b). 
A possible explanation for different output growths is a variation in countries’ competitive 
position (Blanchard, 2007). As a proxy for competitiveness we use the ECB’s real effective 
exchange rates (REER) for each country, obtained by deflating the nominal exchange rate of 
the euro with the GDP deflator. REER allow for a comparison between EMU countries and 
their main competitors, including other member states. They take into account the possible 
intra-EMU differences in inflation as well as variations in nominal exchange rates between 9 
 
the euro and their main trading partners’ currencies
**. A rise in the index means a loss of 
competitiveness. In Figure 3 we present the REER indices for each country. 
 
Figure 3: EMU countries REER indices (GDP deflators deflated) (1Q1999=100) (1999-2009) 
Country / Year  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Austria  98.7  96.0  95.5  95.1  97.6  98.1  97.3  97.6  97.7  97.6  97.9 
Belgium  98.0  94.2  94.2  95.1  99.5  101.2  101.1  101.4  102.6  104.1  104.8 
Finland  98.1  93.9  95.7  96.0  98.3  98.4  96.3  95.2  96.4  97.1  98.2 
France  97.8  93.2  93.0  94.2  98.5  99.4  98.8  99.1  100.3  102.2  101.9 
Germany  97.5  89.7  88.5  88.8  93.3  93.7  91.4  89.5  89.9  89.7  90.5 
Greece  98.4  94.9  95.4  97.5  103.6  105.9  105.7  106.6  108.2  111.0  111.5 
Ireland  98.6  95.7  99.4  104.0  113.3  115.7  115.8  117.6  118.7  119.1  113.9 
Italy  98.5  94.3  95.2  97.5  103.5  105.6  104.7  104.3  105.4  107.2  108.9 
Luxembourg  100.8  98.6  96.7  97.4  104.8  105.8  108.0  112.7  114.8  117.8  116.0 
Netherlands  98.5  96.1  99.4  102.7  108.7  109.1  108.9  108.5  109.3  111.1  109.9 
Portugal  99.4  98.0  99.2  100.9  104.4  105.3  105.0  105.3  106.3  107.2  106.9 
Spain  99.4  97.9  100.0  102.9  108.9  112.2  114.3  116.7  118.7  120.6  120.6 
Source: European Central Bank 
 
It  is  visible  that  there  was  significant  divergence  in  REER  among  EMU  countries.  It  is 
important to note that three economies (Germany, Austria and Finland) have improved their 
position.  Of  the  remaining,  Spain  and  Ireland  have  suffered  a  particularly  steep  loss  of 
competitiveness.  Also,  whereas  Ireland  and  Luxembourg  started  regaining  some 
competitiveness, Spain, Greece and Italy have either stagnated or kept on losing ground. 
This loss of competitiveness is partially to blame for the persistent current account deficits in 







                                                       
** http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browseExplanation.do?node=6374972 assessed on February 26
th, 2011. 10 
 
Figure 4: EMU countries current account as a share of GDP (%) (1999-2009) 
Country / Year  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Austria  -1.7  -0.5  -0.8  2.6  1.6  1.8  2.2  2.9  3.5  4.6  2.9 
Belgium  5.1  4.0  3.4  4.3  3.5  3.2  2.1  2.0  1.7  -1.8  0.3 
Finland  6.2  8.1  8.6  8.9  5.2  6.3  3.6  4.6  4.2  2.9  2.7 
France  3.1  1.4  1.8  1.2  0.8  0.5  -0.5  -0.5  -1.0  -2.0  -2.0 
Germany  -1.3  -1.8  0.0  2.0  1.9  4.6  5.0  6.2  7.5  6.2  5.6 
Greece  n/a  -7.8  -7.2  -6.5  -6.6  -5.8  -7.5  -11.3  -14.3  -14.7  -11.0 
Ireland  0.6  0.1  -0.6  -1.0  0.0  -0.6  -3.5  -3.6  -5.3  -5.6  -3.0 
Italy  0.7  -0.5  -0.1  -0.8  -1.3  -0.9  -1.7  -2.6  -2.4  -2.9  -2.1 
Luxembourg  8.7  13.5  8.8  10.2  8.3  12.0  11.2  9.9  9.6  4.9  7.0 
Netherlands  3.8  1.9  2.4  2.5  5.5  7.6  7.4  9.3  6.7  4.4  4.9 
Portugal  -8.2  -10.4  -10.4  -8.3  -6.5  -8.3  -10.4  -10.7  -10.1  -12.6  -10.2 
Spain  -2.9  -4.0  -4.0  -3.3  -3.5  -5.2  -7.4  -9.0  -10.0  -9.6  -5.1 
Source: OECD 
 
We can see that large and persistent deficits were run in Greece and Portugal, but also in 
Spain and Italy. Differently, Finland and Luxembourg had surpluses in their current accounts 
in every year, and so did Germany and Austria from 2002. These deficits, initially considered 
benign (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002), became ever more worrying as they often combined 
with sagging economic  growth (except  for Spain). We now know they eventually helped 
bringing  about  the  current  sovereign  debt  crisis  (Arghyrou  and  Chortareas,  2008;  OECD, 
2010; Zemanek et al. 2010). 
These  very  different  economic  trajectories  reduce  the  effectiveness  of  a  single  monetary 
policy (Friedman, 1953). It might also lead to the need for clearly distinct policies for some 
countries, which turns out to be impossible within a monetary union. 11 
 
 
4. THE EMU UNDER OCA PROPERTIES 
In order to understand the previously presented reality, we analyse the evolution of the EMU in 
regard to OCA properties. At this time, the analysis is still of a descriptive type. We divide 
our focus on six OCA properties and, for each of them, we use appropriate indicators. We will 
not analyse political factors since they are harder to quantify and there were no significant 
changes in the EMU’s framework in the studied period, as we have previously seen. Figure 5 
summarises those properties and indicators. 
Figure 5: Selected OCA properties and respective indicators 
OCA properties  Indicators  Authors (year) 
Labour market integration and 
wages flexibility 
Unemployment rate  Mundell (1961) 
Long-term unemployment rate  OECD (1999) 
Share of EMU citizens living in 
foreign EMU countries  OECD (1999) 
Nominal wages  Arpaia and Pichelmann (2007) 
Productivity and unit labour costs  Arpaia and Pichelmann (2007) 
Financial and capital markets 
integration 
Government bond yields  Danthine et al. (2001) 
FDI  Mongelli (2008) 
Economic openness  Openness to trade ratio  Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) 
Diversification of production   Structure of external trade  Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) 
Similarity and flexibility of 
inflation rates and price levels 
Inflation rates  Fleming (1971) 
Purchasing power parity  Koedijk et al. (2004) 
Fiscal Integration 
Budget balance and stock of debt as 
share of the GDP  OECD (1999) 
EU revenues as a share of the GNI  Mongelli (2005) 
 
Labour market integration and wages flexibility 
The first OCA property mentioned in the literature was labour market flexibility, for in its 
presence regional shocks would be more easily compensated (Mundell, 1961). Accordingly, 
we assess whether this compensation effect has been present in the EMU by measuring the 
dispersion of unemployment rates. In the presence of an integrated labour market, workers 
would  move  away  from  high-unemployment,  thus  the  dispersion  of  unemployment  rates 
would decrease. In Figure 6 we present unemployment rates for the analysed period. For 12 
 
purpose of analysis, we also included data for the first 15 countries that joined EU, which 
includes the 12 studied countries, plus Denmark, the United Kingdom and Sweden. 
Figure 6: EMU countries unemployment rates (%) (1999-2009) 
 
Source: Eurostat 
The standard deviation of the unemployment rates has consistently decreased until 2007, even 
in periods that unemployment rate increased in the EMU and in the EU. Such an evolution 
points  towards  labour  market  integration.  This  tendency  was  interrupted  in  the  last  two 
studied years, which we can assume to be a consequence of the global crisis (IMF, 2011b). 
To assess inter-sectorial mobility we use long-term unemployment rates (12 months or more). 
A high rate can be a sign of workers’ difficulty to find a job in a different sector after an 
asymmetrical shock (OECD, 1999). We present the selected data in Figure 7. 
Figure 7: EMU countries long term unemployment rates (%) (1999-2009) 
 
Source: Eurostat 13 
 
Data shows a tendency of reduction in long term unemployment rates. Simultaneously, the 
dispersion of this variable has also been decreasing consistently, except for 2009, which we 
can see as a sign of increased inter-sectorial mobility. This conclusion is reinforced by a fall 
in the dispersion of this variable, which can be read as a sign that the labour force has gained 
inter-sectorial mobility either inside their countries or by moving to other member states. It 
would also be interesting to take a look at geographic mobility. Unfortunately, data regarding 
intra-EU migration movements is generally patchy, as EU citizens enjoy total freedom of 
movement  inside  the  Union  (OECD,  2007).  Nevertheless  the  literature  stresses  that 
geographic mobility in the EU is very low, though it is increasing (OECD, 2007).  
A different perspective of the labour market is given by the evolution of wages. In monetary 
union, nominal wages flexibility is of paramount importance to compensate for asymmetrical 
shocks, since there are  no nominal exchange rates to restore the previous equilibrium. In 
Figure 8 we present the initial average value and accumulated growth in nominal wages, 
productivity and unit labour costs (ULC). 
Figure 8: Accumulated growth in wages, productivity and ULC in the EMU (1999=100) (1999-2009) 
Country  1999 average 
nominal wages 
Nominal 
wages  Productivity  ULC 
Austria  32075,64  124.43  115.05  111.44 
Belgium  36931,69  130.60  105.58  123.70 
Finland  29843,00  139.06  110.91  125.19 
France (values for 2008)  33039,36  128.96  113.19  118.46 
Germany  30690,25  111.37  112.89  105.99 
Greece  16478,56  173.93  129.43  137.88 
Ireland  28085,62  164.63  132.57  132.77 
Italy  27076,15  126.59  100.68  131.44 
Luxembourg  39464,91  135.83  100.62  134.99 
Netherlands  28978,06  137.64  112.66  127.28 
Portugal  14095,74  142.29  109.98  129.39 
Spain  21981,78  141.96  110.05  134.58 
Source: OECD 
 
Data reveals a tendency for bigger nominal wage growth in the countries that had smaller 
nominal wages when they joined the EMU. This is not surprising as in an integrated market 
wages are expected to converge. However there are several cases that deserve a closer look. 
Italy had the third smaller increase albeit having the fourth smaller starting nominal wages. 
Greece and Ireland had especially big nominal wages increases in the studied period.  14 
 
As we have seen, unless nominal wage increases are combined with a growth in productivity, 
they will result in loss of competitiveness as well as an increase in inflation (Campolmi and 
Faia, 2011). However, only Germany kept nominal wage increases in line with productivity 
growth, with the consequent small increase in ULC. Even though other countries managed to 
achieve significant productivity growth, namely Ireland and Greece, these gains were more 
than outpaced by increases in nominal wages, resulting in a loss of competitiveness. The 
situation was even direr in Spain and Portugal, where steep nominal wages increases were 
combined with lacklustre productivity growth. These results are broadly consistent with the 
variations in REER and the current accounts balances detailed in the previous chapter. 
Therefore, it is arguable that many EMU countries did not have the wage flexibility required 
to  maintain  their  competitive  positions  in  the  first  decade  of  currency  union.  The  same 
assessment has been frequently made on the literature (e.g. OECD, 2010).  
 
Financial and capital markets integration 
Seminal contributions also underlined the importance of the integration of financial markets, 
to  compensate  for  asymmetric  shocks  (Ingram,  1962).  We  begin  by  taking  a  look  at  the 
government bonds market. The convergence of interest rates on public debt, once the effect of 
fundamental risk, also known as credit risk, is removed, is a sign of increased integration in 
financial markets (Danthine et al., 2001).  In Figure 9 we present the non-weighted standard 
deviation  of  the  interest  rates  on  ten  years  government  bonds,  both  with  and  without 
Luxembourg, for this country is especially small and we have no data for it from 2007. 
Figure 9: Interest rates on EMU governments ten years bonds (%) (1999-2009) 
 
Source: OECD 15 
 
Interest rates tended to converge, especially when we exclude Luxembourg from the analysis. 
This tendency was reversed in the last two years, much as a consequence of the steep increase 
in Greece and Ireland’s interest rates. This is, however, a result of differentiated perceived 
risk  in  the  titles  and  not  a  financial  disintegration  (IMF,  2011a).  The  private  sector  debt 
market also grew during this period (Mongelli, 2008), pointing towards increased integration.  
A different proxy is Foreign  Direct  Investment (FDI) between EMU countries (Mongelli, 
2008). Unfortunately, we could not find complete information in this regard. Still, intra-EMU 
FDI as a share of the GDP increased from one fifth to one third (European Commission, 
2008a) and total intra-EMU FDI grew more than 240% (Mongelli, 2008). 
 
Economic openness 
The more a country is integrated in international trade, the more benefits it can enjoy from 
belonging  to  a  currency  area  (McKinnon,  1963).  A  simple  yet  accurate  measure  of  this 
integration is the openness ratio, which is calculated by dividing the total imports and exports 
of a country by its GDP (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997).  In Figure 10 we present the 
openness ratio of each EMU country. 
Figure 10: EMU countries openness ratio (constant prices) (%) (1999-2009) 
Country / 
Year  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Austria  84.3  91.1  96.0  96.1  98.1  105.2  109.8  112.9  117.5  115.0  101.3 
Belgium  142.2  153.6  153.3  154.0  154.0  159.0  164.5  167.9  170.6  172.8  157.5 
Finland  70.3  78.1  77.5  78.6  77.3  80.1  84.8  89.5  91.5  96.5  84.7 
France  51.4  56.2  56.5  56.8  56.2  57.9  59.4  61.1  62.2  62.1  56.4 
Germany  61.3  66.4  68.1  69.1  71.9  77.4  82.3  89.6  92.9  94.6  87.4 
Greece  57.6  63.2  61.1  56.7  55.1  57.8  57.0  58.6  59.8  59.6  51.2 
Ireland  165.8  183.1  186.9  182.6  174.3  179.9  180.7  181.4  183.4  186.3  189.6 
Italy  49.7  53.2  53.4  52.4  52.2  53.7  54.2  56.4  57.9  56.2  49.3 
Luxembourg  271.0  279.0  286.2  279.0  293.6  313.3  310.0  332.2  338.7  346.6  330.8 
Netherlands  124.0  134.6  135.0  135.7  137.5  143.7  148.8  155.5  158.9  160.8  153.3 
Portugal  67.1  69.0  68.6  68.7  70.3  73.4  73.9  79.4  82.5  83.8  76.3 
Spain  58.2  61.2  61.6  61.7  62.9  65.2  66.3  69.3  71.9  69.0  60.8 
Source: OECD 
If we ignore the exceptional  year of 2009, when the world crisis caused a contraction in 
global  trade  (IMF,  2010),  all  the  countries  had  a  tendency  to  have  an  increase  in  their 
openness ratio, or at least to maintain it. It is interesting to note that while some countries 
greatly increased their openness ratio, namely Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany and 16 
 
Belgium, others had only slight or negligible increases, like Greece and Italy. This results in 
unequal benefits from the single currency and possibly points out to shifts in competitiveness. 
A different set of benefits from a single currency are related to the elimination of exchange 
rates risk and transaction costs inside the euro area (Emerson et al. 1992). Accordingly, in 
Figure 11 present the Intra-EMU openness ratio, i.e., considering only intra-EMU trade. 
Figure 11: Countries’ Intra-EMU openness ratio (current prices) (%) (1999-2009) 
Country / 
Year  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Austria  38.1  41.5  42.1  41.7  42.2  44.5  44.7  48.2  48.9  48.0  40.9 
Belgium  76.3  84.8  85.4  88.7  88.7  92.4  97.8  103.8  105.9  105.5  88.3 
Finland  21.5  24.1  22.1  21.3  22.0  21.9  22.5  24.6  24.6  23.2  18.1 
France  23.3  25.6  25.2  23.9  23.6  24.1  24.2  24.8  25.2  25.0  21.5 
Germany  22.6  25.5  25.8  25.1  25.7  27.2  28.2  30.0  31.0  31.2  26.3 
Greece  15.9  17.0  16.8  15.9  15.5  15.4  14.3  14.8  15.4  15.0  12.4 
Ireland  42.6  44.4  44.3  40.1  35.8  36.0  36.9  34.6  32.3  31.1  33.1 
Italy  18.3  20.1  19.7  18.7  18.8  18.9  19.0  20.1  20.9  20.5  16.9 
Luxembourg  65.1  86.3  87.7  77.1  82.9  88.5  79.2  76.3  73.6  77.0  60.1 
Netherlands  55.5  61.6  58.2  54.6  54.1  57.5  60.1  64.2  65.2  66.3  56.6 
Portugal  35.8  40.4  42.6  38.8  38.5  38.6  36.4  36.6  36.4  36.8  32.6 
Spain  25.8  27.8  26.3  25.1  25.2  25.2  24.8  24.9  25.1  23.4  19.1 
Source: Eurostat 
This data shows some relevant tendencies. On the one hand, most of the countries’ intra-EMU 
trade did not rise as share of the GDP. When excluding the year of 2009, for the reasons 
discussed  above,  we  see  that  the  openness  ratio  increased  significantly  in  Belgium, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria and Germany. On the other hand, it decreased steeply 
in Ireland but also in Spain and Greece. A plausible explanation for these findings is the 
already described loss of competitiveness in these countries, vis-à-vis their EMU partners. 
 
Diversification of production 
Countries with diversified production benefit more from monetary unification, as shocks that 
affect one part of the market are more easily compensated by the remaining ones (Kenen, 
1969). Accordingly, we analyse the exports of EMU countries by sector, as a measure of 
diversification of production (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997). In Figure 12 we present the 
share of each sector in the total exports of the EMU from 1999 to 2009. Products are divided 
according to the SITC. 
 17 
 
Figure 12: Share of each sector in total exports in the EMU (%) (1999-2009) 
Sector / Year  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Food, drinks and 
tobacco 
6.83  6.31  6.35  6.42  6.56  6.25  6.15  5.98  6.06  6.34  7.04 




1.79  2.56  2.33  2.37  2.62  2.67  3.76  4.23  4.06  5.16  3.98 
Chemicals and 
related products 








35.12  35.57  35.60  34.27  33.96  33.83  32.72  31.93  31.68  30.41  28.56 
Services  20.62  20.05  20.48  20.94  20.91  20.90  21.12  21.06  21.32  22.06  24.19 
Standard Deviation  12.36  12.32  12.36  11.95  11.77  11.75  11.26  11.01  10.96  10.44  10.32 
Source: Eurostat and European Commission 
There are signs of increased diversification, using the standard deviation as a measure. It is 
clear that services have become more important in the external trade of the EMU and that 
machinery  and  transport  equipment,  despite  having  lost  some  weight,  remain  the  most 
significant sector in the total exports. Nevertheless, since data is aggregated in only eight 
sectors, possible intra-sectorial changes are not revealed. 
With a different aim in mind we now take a look at the comparative diversification between 
EMU countries. For each country we have calculated each sector’s share in total exports and 
then we have calculated the difference between these shares and the EMU’s shares. In Figure 
13 we present the sum of these differences, in absolute value, for each country. 
Figure 13: Sum of the absolute value of the differences in export shares by sector between EMU countries 
and the EMU (pp) (1999-2009) 
Country / 
Year  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Austria  24.2  22.9  22.1  19.6  20.3  16.7  19.2  20.4  19.2  20.9  21.3 
Belgium  28.4  28.3  26.9  32.3  31.8  33.2  34.6  35.3  35.1  33.5  33.3 
Finland  28.9  34.2  28.5  27.5  30.1  28.3  26.4  28.8  26.4  25.8  27.5 
France  12.8  12.2  12.1  10.8  11.1  11.0  9.2  9.7  8.1  8.6  9.9 
Germany  23.4  23.3  23.9  25.1  25.8  24.9  25.0  24.0  24.3  25.2  24.8 
Greece  92.6  91.7  92.6  91.2  88.8  94.4  91.1  88.0  88.0  88.2  84.0 
Ireland  33.5  36.7  41.9  50.9  60.0  63.7  66.0  70.4  75.9  79.3  79.3 
Italy  22.7  23.3  24.4  23.9  23.1  22.8  21.9  21.4  21.0  22.3  23.0 
Luxembourg  102.3  105.6  96.8  96.7  95.9  98.8  98.5  99.9  110.3  109.3  107.6 
Netherlands  24.9  24.1  24.6  25.3  24.1  22.1  24.9  27.0  26.5  30.4  27.7 
Portugal  35.8  35.4  36.3  35.2  33.7  33.9  32.3  30.8  32.2  32.0  36.2 
Spain  30.5  29.2  31.1  30.6  29.8  29.0  29.2  29.0  28.2  27.4  28.1 
Source: Eurostat and European Commission 18 
 
Data gives us a picture of very different economies. Especially, Luxembourg, Greece and 
Ireland’s structure of exports were very different from the EMU’s. Therefore, in regard to 
trade, these three countries are the most vulnerable to asymmetric shocks in relation to the 
remaining EMU. When analysing tendencies we can see that most of countries’ structures 
haven’t changed significantly with the exception of Ireland. From this data it is not possible to 
infer an increasing homogeneity in countries’ economic structure. 
 
Similarity and flexibility of inflation rates and price levels  
Fleming (1971) considered similar inflation rates essential to form an OCA. Accordingly, we 
compare inflation rates in the twelve countries. In Figure 14 we present the percentage change 
on  the  previous  year  of  the  Harmonised  Index of  Consumer  Prices  (HICP)  for  the  EMU 
countries.  Additionally,  for  each  country,  we  have  calculated  the  sum  of  the  differences 
between its inflation rates and the EMU’s. 
Figure 14: Annual change of the HICP in the EMU countries (%) (1999-2009) 
Country / 
Year  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  Avg.  Sum of 
diff. 
Austria  0.5  2.0  2.3  1.7  1.3  2.0  2.1  1.7  2.2  3.2  0.4  1.8  -2.9 
Belgium  1.1  2.7  2.4  1.6  1.5  1.9  2.5  2.3  1.8  4.5  0.0  2.0  0.1 
Finland  1.3  2.9  2.7  2.0  1.3  0.1  0.8  1.3  1.6  3.9  1.6  1.8  -2.6 
France  0.6  1.8  1.8  1.9  2.2  2.3  1.9  1.9  1.6  3.2  0.1  1.8  -2.9 
Germany   0.6  1.4  1.9  1.4  1.0  1.8  1.9  1.8  2.3  2.8  0.2  1.6  -5.1 
Greece  2.1  2.9  3.7  3.9  3.4  3.0  3.5  3.3  3.0  4.2  1.3  3.1  12.2 
Ireland  2.5  5.3  4.0  4.7  4.0  2.3  2.2  2.7  2.9  3.1  -1.7  2.9  9.7 
Italy  1.7  2.6  2.3  2.6  2.8  2.3  2.2  2.2  2.0  3.5  0.8  2.3  2.8 
Lux.  1.0  3.8  2.4  2.1  2.5  3.2  3.8  3.0  2.7  4.1  0.0  2.6  6.3 
Nether.  2.0  2.3  5.1  3.9  2.2  1.4  1.5  1.7  1.6  2.2  1.0  2.3  2.7 
Portugal  2.2  2.8  4.4  3.7  3.3  2.5  2.1  3.0  2.4  2.7  -0.9  2.6  6.0 
Spain  2.2  3.5  2.8  3.6  3.1  3.1  3.4  3.6  2.8  4.1  -0.2  2.9  9.8 
EMU (12 
countries) 
1.1  2.1  2.4  2.3  2.1  2.1  2.2  2.2  2.1  3.3  0.3     
Standard 
Deviation 
0.72  1.02  1.06  1.14  0.96  0.84  0.86  0.74  0.52  0.72  0.93     
Source: Eurostat 
 
In the first years of the euro inflation rates diverged and from 2002 to 2007 they steadily 
converged. Then, they diverged again. The ECB’s objective of keeping EMU’s inflation rate 
below but close to 2% (European Commission, 2008a) was achieved only in 1999 and 2009, 
though inflation was generally close to the benchmark.  However, differences can be noted. 19 
 
Especially Greece, Ireland and Spain had high inflation rates. These countries also had, as we 
have previously analysed, some of the bigger increases in wages with the consequent loss of 
competitiveness.  This  can,  in  most  cases,  be  explained  by  the  Balassa-Samuelson  effect 
(Mongelli, 2008) and by labour markets’ rigidity (Campolmi and Faia, 2011). 
A complementary explanation for different inflation rates would be that some countries had 
lower price levels in 1999 and, according to the PPP theory, their price levels increased faster 
as they converged (Koedijk et al., 2004). In Figure 15, we present PPP levels, defined as the 
amount of currency units a given quantity of goods and services costs in each country. 
 
Figure 15: PPPs in the EMU countries (EU27=1) (1999-2009) 
Country / Year  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
EU27  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Austria  1.060  1.035  1.068  1.048  1.047  1.038  1.059  1.051  1.068  1.092  1.121 
Belgium  1.065  1.025  1.031  1.012  1.039  1.064  1.074  1.084  1.092  1.120  1.149 
Finland  1.159  1.144  1.178  1.174  1.196  1.157  1.167  1.166  1.158  1.178  1.208 
France  1.110  1.080  1.070  1.059  1.110  1.116  1.103  1.109  1.100  1.137  1.165 
Germany  1.127  1.112  1.113  1.102  1.086  1.064  1.035  1.028  1.023  1.042  1.069 
Greece  0.787  0.780  0.781  0.772  0.815  0.825  0.853  0.858  0.885  0.898  0.943 
Ireland  1.075  1.106  1.156  1.175  1.200  1.194  1.206  1.208  1.180  1.217  1.198 
Italy  0.946  0.940  0.941  0.989  1.010  1.036  1.035  1.023  1.006  1.009  1.033 
Luxembourg  1.088  1.081  1.104  1.093  1.114  1.095  1.138  1.123  1.138  1.160  1.197 
Netherlands  1.048  1.026  1.055  1.055  1.097  1.079  1.070  1.066  1.056  1.084  1.125 
Portugal  0.805  0.805  0.822  0.829  0.835  0.850  0.817  0.813  0.812  0.831  0.840 
Spain  0.847  0.844  0.862  0.858  0.891  0.901  0.913  0.903  0.897  0.922  0.944 
Standard Deviation  0.130  0.126  0.132  0.131  0.128  0.117  0.121  0.121  0.116  0.121  0.119 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Indeed, the PPPs between countries tended to converge. However, firm conclusions cannot be 
taken from so small a period. Other studies pointed out that this tendency had begun before 
1999 (Lopez and Papell, 2007; Zhou et al., 2008). Moreover, the initial low price levels in 
Greece, Portugal and Spain are consistent with the higher inflation rates in these countries. On 






As we have mentioned, budgetary discipline is the only fiscal integration approach in the 
EMU (Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998). Accordingly, we start by taking a look at budget 
balances, in Figure 16, having in mind the deficit limit of 3% (De Grauwe, 2007). 
Figure 16: EMU countries budget balances as a share of national GDP (%) (1999-2009) 
Country / 
Year  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  Average 
Austria  -2.3  -1.7  0.0  -0.7  -1.5  -4.5  -1.7  -1.6  -0.9  -0.9  -4.1  -1.8 
Belgium  -0.6  0.0  0.4  -0.1  -0.1  -0.3  -2.7  0.1  -0.3  -1.3  -5.9  -1.0 
Finland  1.6  6.8  5.0  4.0  2.4  2.3  2.7  4.0  5.2  4.2  -2.6  3.2 
France  -1.8  -1.5  -1.5  -3.1  -4.1  -3.6  -2.9  -2.3  -2.7  -3.3  -7.5  -3.1 
Germany  -1.5  1.3  -2.8  -3.7  -4.0  -3.8  -3.3  -1.6  0.3  0.1  -3.0  -2.0 
Greece  :  -3.7  -4.5  -4.8  -5.6  -7.5  -5.2  -5.7  -6.4  -9.8  -15.4  -6.9 
Ireland  2.7  4.7  0.9  -0.4  0.4  1.4  1.6  2.9  0.1  -7.3  -14.3  -0.7 
Italy  -1.7  -0.8  -3.1  -2.9  -3.5  -3.5  -4.3  -3.4  -1.5  -2.7  -5.4  -3.0 
Lux.  3.4  6.0  6.1  2.1  0.5  -1.1  0.0  1.4  3.7  3.0  -0.9  2.2 
Nether.  0.4  2.0  -0.2  -2.1  -3.1  -1.7  -0.3  0.5  0.2  0.6  -5.5  -0.8 
Portugal  -2.7  -2.9  -4.3  -2.9  -3.0  -3.4  -5.9  -4.1  -3.1  -3.5  -10.1  -4.2 
Spain  -1.4  -1.0  -0.6  -0.5  -0.2  -0.3  1.0  2.0  1.9  -4.2  -11.1  -1.3 
Average  -0.4  0.8  -0.4  -1.3  -1.8  -2.2  -1.8  -0.7  -0.3  -2.1  -7.2   
Number of 
violations 
0  1  3  3  5  6  4  3  2  5  10   
Source: Eurostat 
 
We  can  see  that  the  deficit  limit  agreed  on  the  MT  was  violated  every  year  since  2000. 
Nevertheless, the years 2008 and 2009 must be analysed in the light of the economic crisis 
(IMF, 2010). It is clear that some countries were persistent transgressors, especially Greece, 
but also Portugal, Italy and France. Moreover, even when ignoring 2008 and 2009, only five 
countries  (Belgium,  Finland,  Ireland,  Luxembourg  and  Spain)  never  breached  the  limit. 
Greece was especially rule-breaking, however its true fiscal position was revealed only later 
as statistical data was reviewed during the sovereign debt crisis (OECD, 2010). 
When we consider the economic growth in years of excessive deficits, from 1999 to 2007, we 
see that all violations, bar Germany in 2003, occurred in years with positive or null growth. 
Even admitting that yearly variations might hide negative performance between quarters, we 
can conclude that budgetary discipline was not systematically present in the EMU from 1999 
to 2009. This situation led to an accumulation of public which is shown in Figure 17. We pay 
special attention to the debt limit of 60% of the GDP (Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998). 
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Figure 17: EMU government consolidated gross debt as a share of national GDP (%) (1999-2009) 
Country / Year  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Austria  67.3  66.5  67.3  66.7  65.8  65.2  64.6  62.8  60.7  63.8  69.6 
Belgium  113.7  107.9  106.6  103.5  98.5  94.2  92.1  88.1  84.2  89.6  96.2 
Finland  45.7  43.8  42.5  41.5  44.5  44.4  41.7  39.7  35.2  34.1  43.8 
France  58.9  57.3  56.9  58.8  62.9  64.9  66.4  63.7  63.9  67.7  78.3 
Germany  60.9  59.7  58.8  60.4  63.9  65.8  68.0  67.6  64.9  66.3  73.5 
Greece  94.0  103.4  103.7  101.7  97.4  98.6  100.0  106.1  105.4  110.7  127.1 
Ireland  48.5  37.8  35.5  32.1  30.9  29.6  27.4  24.8  25.0  44.4  65.6 
Italy  113.7  109.2  108.8  105.7  104.4  103.9  105.9  106.6  103.6  106.3  116.1 
Luxembourg  6.4  6.2  6.3  6.3  6.1  6.3  6.1  6.7  6.7  13.6  14.6 
Netherlands  61.1  53.8  50.7  50.5  52.0  52.4  51.8  47.4  45.3  58.2  60.8 
Portugal  49.6  48.5  51.2  53.8  55.9  57.6  62.8  63.9  68.3  71.6  83.0 
Spain  62.3  59.3  55.5  52.5  48.7  46.2  43.0  39.6  36.1  39.8  53.3 
Number of 
violations 
7  4  4  5  6  6  7  7  7  7  9 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Data  shows  us  that,  already  in  1999,  seven  countries  exceeded  the  debt  limit,  and  that 
violations  were  frequent.  As  a  consequence,  apprehension  concerning  the  high  levels  of 
public debt in some EMU countries triggered the sovereign debt crisis in 2010 (Zemanek, 
2010) and, as of August 2011, three member states asked for external help to meet their 
refinancing needs: Greece, Ireland and Portugal (European Commission, 2011). 
The EU budget can be used to transfer resources from richer to poorer regions, thus being an 
imperfect proxy for fiscal integration in the EMU (Mongelli, 2005). These own resources 
have a maximum limit, agreed by EU governments, which for the period between 2007 and 
2013 was reduced from 1.24% to 1.23% of the EU GNI. Indeed, EU’s revenues as a share of 
the GNI have steadily decreased from 1999 to 2006, and have then started increasing slightly, 
remaining well below the limit of 1.23% (European Commission 2008b, 2010). Therefore, we 
confirm that the EU budget was not reinforced in order to support the possible needs for fiscal 
integration in the context of the EMU. 
In this chapter we have analysed the EMU under the perspective of six OCA properties, using 
several indications. Our findings were not always conclusive and all the indicators did not 





Figure 18: Summary of the assessment of OCA properties 
OCA properties  Indicators  Main findings 
Labour  market  integration 
and wages flexibility 
Unemployment rate  Signs of geographic mobility as these rates 
converged until 2007 
Long-term unemployment rate 
Decrease  and  convergence,  pointing 
towards  inter-sectorial  and  geographic 
mobility 
Share of EMU citizens living 
in foreign EMU countries 
Scarce  data  available.  Reviewed  studies 
indicate that the share is small 
Nominal wages  Generally,  countries  with  smaller  nominal 
wages in 1999 had bigger increases. These 
increases in wages surpassed the growth in 
productivity,  resulting  in  different  patterns 
of growth of ULC in the euro area 
Productivity  and  unit  labour 
costs 
Financial and capital markets 
integration 
Government bond yields  Significant convergence until the sovereign 
debt crisis 
FDI 
Scarce  data  available.  Reviewed  studies 
indicate  that  intra-EMU  FDI  increased 
substantially 
Economic openness  Openness to trade ratio 
Core  euro  area  countries  increased  their 
intra-EMU  trade,  possibly  as  a  result  of 
gains in competitiveness. Differently, some 
periphery  countries  traded  less  inside  the 
EMU 
Diversification of production   Structure of external trade  No signs of homogenisation of structures in 
the EMU 
Similarity  and  flexibility  of 
inflation rates and price levels 
Inflation rates 
Inflation rates were lower than in previous 
decades. There were periods of convergence 
and of divergence between EMU countries 
Purchasing power parity  There was a tendency for converge in price 
levels in the EMU 
Fiscal Integration 
Budget  balance  and  stock  of 
debt as share of the GDP 
There  were  several  cases  of  fiscal 
indiscipline,  thus  the  envisioned  fiscal 
cushion did not materialize 
EU revenues as a share of the 
GNI 






5. EXPLAINING CHANGES IN COMPETITIVENESS AS A RESULT OF OCA PROPERTIES 
After analysing the evolution of the selected OCA properties in the first ten years of the 
EMU, we assess their quantitative impact on the euro area’s competitiveness. For this purpose 
we use REER as a proxy. Accordingly, we adapt the model put forward by Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1997), which simultaneously considers several OCA properties and their impact 
in exchange rates. The original model aimed at explaining bilateral nominal exchange rate 
variation as a function of three OCA properties: asymmetric disturbances to output, trade 
linkages and the usefulness of money for transactions. 
We introduce some changes in the model. Inevitably, we consider real exchange-rates instead 
of nominal ones. Bayoumi and Eichengreen considered that real exchange-rates would yield 
similar results to nominal ones. On the other hand, we introduce a new variable: the growth of 
unit labour costs. Since the labour market was the first dimension considered in the OCA 
theory  (Mundell,  1961),  we  believe  that  its  performance  can  be  useful  to  understand 
differences in EMU countries’ competitive position. Since inflation rates are implicit in real 
exchange rates it would not make sense to include them in this analysis. Finally, whereas 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen used averages from periods of ten years for each variable, we use 
annual data, due to the fact that our studied period comprises only eleven years.  Therefore, 
we propose the following equation: 
REERij = a + β1OUTPUTij + β2DISSIMij + β 3TRADEij + β4LOG(SIZE)ij + β5ULCij 
Where, considering each year: 
REERij is the difference, in absolute value, between variations in the real effective exchange-rates of countries i 
and j (source: ECB).  
OUTPUTij is the difference, in absolute value, between the real GDP growth rates of countries i and j. 
DISSIMij is the sum of the differences, in absolute value, of the share of each group of products or services in 
the countries’ total exports, between countries i and j. 
TRADEij is the mean of the bilateral exports to GDP ratio between countries i and j. 
LOG(SIZE)ij is the logarithm of the mean of the sum of the countries’ GDP. 
ULCij is the difference, in absolute value, between the ULC growth rates of countries i and j, in each year. ULC 
is measured as the average cost of labour per unit of output. 




Figure 19: Expected signs of the variables coefficients 
Variable  Expected Sign  Authors 
OUTPUT  +  Friedman (1953) 
DISSIM  +  Mundell (1961) 
TRADE  - / +  Frankel and Rose (1998) / Kenen (1969) and Krugman (1993) 
LOG(SIZE)  -  McKinnon (1963) 
ULC  +  Mundell (1961) 
 
In a flexible system, differences in economic performance result in exchange rates movements 
(Friedman,  1953).  Thus,  we  expect  OUTPUT  to  have  a  positive  coefficient.  The  more 
different countries are, the more asymmetric shocks they tend to suffer and therefore their 
exchange rates are expected to vary more, giving DISSIM a positive coefficient. If more trade 
results in the specialization of economies, more asymmetric shocks are to be expected, thus 
bigger  variations  in  exchange  rates  (Krugman,  1993)  and  TRADE  will  have  a  positive 
coefficient. On the other hand, if increased trade promotes more homogeneous economies 
their economic cycles are expected to become more harmonised (Frankel and Rose, 1998) and 
TRADE will have a negative coefficient. The bigger the size of the pair of countries is, the 
bigger  is  the  pool  of  non-tradable  goods  and  services  available,  which  protects  their 
economies from fluctuations in relative prices (McKinnon, 1963). Therefore we expect their 
REER to vary less, resulting in a negative coefficient of LOG(SIZE). 
In monetary unions, countries with rigid labour markets might see their competitiveness erode 
with time, as bigger increases in labour costs will, ceteris paribus, result in a decrease in 
competitiveness (OECD, 1999). Hence, we expect ULC to have a positive coefficient. 
For the estimation of our equation, a first precautionary step was to calculate the correlation 
between  our  proposed  variables,  especially  between  DISSIM  and  TRADE.  The  obtained 
correlogram did not show signs of correlations that could endanger the statistical inference, 
thus we preceded to the estimation of the proposed model, using the method of ordinary least 




Figure 20 - Main findings of models estimation 
Variable 
Proposed model  Without ULC  6 dummies (cross-
weighed) 
Coefficient  Prob.  Coefficient  Prob.  Coefficient  Prob. 
C  1.250223  0.1293  1.286116  0.1237  0.370191  0.5729 
OUTPUT  0.059581  0.0438  0.069347  0.0207  0.055443  0.0354 
DISSIM  0.005113  0.0034  0.006842  0.0001  0.005189  0.0005 
TRADE  0.034965  0.116  0.018267  0.4167  0.022173  0.2172 
LOG(SIZE)  -0.042224  0.4916  -0.024893  0.6883  0.020851  0.6681 
ULC  0.183257  0.0000  -  -  0.155067  0.0000 
YEAR=1999  -  -  -  -  -0.355975  0.0055 
YEAR=2000  -  -  -  -  0.382194  0.0025 
YEAR=2001  -  -  -  -  0.588734  0.0000 
YEAR=2003  -  -  -  -  0.734882  0.0000 
YEAR=2007  -  -  -  -  -0.745287  0.0000 
YEAR=2008  -  -  -  -  -0.296758  0.0189 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.083613  0.035566  0.223335 
 
From this results we conclude that the variable LOG(SIZE) is not statistically significant and 
TRADE is only significant at a 12% confidence level. On the other hand, OUTPUT, DISSIM 
and ULC have the predicted signs, thus reinforcing the validity of the previously reviewed 
OCA  theory.  Comparable  results  were  obtained  by  Bayoumi  and  Eichengreen  (1997). 
TRADE,  however,  has  a  positive  coefficient,  which  points  toward  the  specialization 
paradigm. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) had concluded otherwise. 
If we want to follow more closely Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997), a pertinent adaptation of 
our  model  would  be  to  discard  the  variable  ULC.  In  this  case,  as  seen  from  Figure  20, 
LOG(SIZE)  and  TRADE  would  be  even  less  statistically  significant  and  the  adjusted  R
2 
would be less than half the one obtained with the complete model. OUTPUT and DISSIM 
would maintain their significance and coefficient signs. 
A  different  approach  would  lead  us  to  remove  the  idiosyncratic  effects  of  each  pair  of 
countries and of years that affected equally the twelve countries. These adaptations allow us 
to concentrate on the importance of the proposed variables. Since REER is calculated using 26 
 
several countries as a reference, most of them with a currency that floats against the euro, 
nominal  variations  in  exchange  rates  will  affect  all  EMU  countries.  We  estimated  the 
significance of dummy variables for each year, with the goal of identifying the years with 
significant impact on REER. In the presented results we include the six significant dummies. 
The results of such estimation (Figure 20 – see “6 dummies”) show that whereas OUTPUT, 
DISSIM  and  ULC  keep  their  coefficients  and  significance  relatively  unchanged,  TRADE 
becomes definitely non-significant. More interesting, however, is that the six selected years 
are not only significant but have a strong effect on REER. The dollar, in particular, weakened 
from 2002 to 2007 (OECD, 2010), which is probably a cause of the significance of the years 
2003 and 2007. 
In our view, the statistical significance of those three variables confirms the validity of the 
model. Also, our results confirm that the OCA theory still provides useful information for the 
debate on the EMU. Apart from output growth and the structure of trade, the evidence from 
our model reinforces the conclusions of previous works that put big increases in unit labour 
costs in some countries as a central cause of the widening gap in competitiveness among 
EMU countries (e.g. European Commission, 2008a; OECD, 2010; Zemanek, 2010). 
It is pertinent to note that the global fit of the model (measured by the adjusted R
2), is small. It 
improves when we introduce dummies for some years, resulting in the inclusion of the effect 
of the euro exchange rate. Also, despite the diminished significance of the variable TRADE, 
this does not mean that trade is not part of the explanation to the divergent competitiveness in 
the  EMU.  In  fact,  the  trade  related  variable  DISSIM  was  found  to  be  significant.    The 
proposed model is admittedly simple. The inclusion of different properties or proxies and the 
use of different estimation procedures would probably shed additional light on this subject. 
We consider our contribution to be a first step that deserves to be further explored. 27 
 
 
6. FINAL REMARKS 
As we have taken a look at different economic aspects, identified as crucial for a successful 
monetary  union  by  the  OCA  theory,  possible  causes  of  the  EMU  current  travails  have 
emerged. This is especially true in labour markets. Whereas unemployment rates converged 
between EMU countries, wage policies give us a different message. Peripheral countries' low 
initial nominal wages grew faster than core countries', yet their productivity growth was, in 
many cases, sluggish, resulting in loss of competitiveness (Arpaia and Pichelmann, 2007; 
OECD, 2010; Zemanek, 2010). 
Other OCA properties  give us interesting information. Both financial  and capital markets 
have shown signs of increased integration. However, the increase in intra-EMU trade appears 
to  have  been  more  the  result  of  a  previous  tendency  than  a  consequence  of  monetary 
unification (Berger and Nitsch, 2008). Moreover, as economies have become more diversified 
no signs of homogenisation, as predicted by Frankel and Rose (1998), were identified.  
The ECB's mandate for keeping inflation close but below 2% (European Commission, 2008a) 
was rarely successful, though inflation rates have been close to the target. Inflation rates in 
peripheral  countries  were  usually  higher.  This  situation  and  the  concurrent  strong  wages 
growth  eroded  their  competitiveness  (Zemanek,  2010).  Fiscal  integration  seen  as  the 
compliance of budgetary rules was a disappointment, for discipline in the run up to the euro 
was succeeded by profligacy. Some countries violated the budget deficit limit every  year 
since 2000, piling up an excessive stock of debt. 
We  measured  the  impact  of  the  most  important  OCA  properties  on  the  relative 
competitiveness of EMU countries. We concluded that different growth in labour costs was an 
important factor, hence putting our work in a growing group of contributions pointing in the 
same way. Differences in output growth and in trade patterns of each pair of countries were 
also deemed significant variables. The impact of the intensity of trade in our model pointed to 
the specialization paradigm predicted by Krugman (1993). This raises questions about the 
impact of trade on the stability of the EMU. However, the significance of the selected variable 
is small, forcing us to look at this conclusion with reinforced caution. 
This work leaves several questions to be answered. Firstly, in each analysed property, some 
countries moved more closely than others: assessing whether a smaller set of countries form a 28 
 
more perfect union would possibly yield new information. Another interesting aspect is the 
impact of political factors on the performance of the EMU. A look at their impact on the 
economic performance of the EMU would certainly contribute to the ongoing debate about 
changes to the European institutional framework.  Possible paths for the EMU to cope with 
the challenges that the sovereign debt crisis is bringing about are, in itself, a rich field of 
future research. As the seminal contribution of Kenen (1969) made clear, having different 
domains for monetary and fiscal policies may be the recipe for disaster. 
As times passes, more data from the EMU will be retrieved and more interesting studies can 
be made. Namely, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) approach of using averages of periods of 
ten years can be replicated. Finally, every single OCA property deserved a more detailed 
study. Nevertheless, the several shortcomings we identified are enough for us to agree with 
the  proposition  that  monetary  union  is  no  excuse  for  countries  to  avoid  doing  structural 
reforms, especially in labour and product markets (Issing, 2000; OECD, 2010). Indeed, the 
loss of autonomous monetary policy would make them indispensable (European Commission, 
2008a).  29 
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